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ABSTRACT
Recommender systems that incorporate a social trust net-
work among their users have the potential to make more per-
sonalized recommendations compared to traditional collab-
orative filtering systems, provided they succeed in utilizing
the additional trust and distrust information to their advan-
tage. We compare the performance of several well-known
trust-enhanced techniques for recommending controversial
reviews from Epinions.com, and provide the first experimen-
tal study of using distrust in the recommendation process.
1. INTRODUCTION
Potential customers increasingly turn to the web to find in-
formation about the products they are interested in. Such
information often comes in the form of online reviews. Nowa-
days, these reviews are not only written by experts anymore,
but also by the customers themselves. In fact, user-supplied
reviews are becoming more and more prevalent, think e.g. of
the well-known e-commerce sites Amazon.com and Epin-
ions.com, or the Internet Movie Database (imdb.com). Un-
fortunately, the wealth of information all too often makes it
very difficult to find the reviews that will be truly helpful. A
lot of systems try to alleviate this by computing one global
score for the review, for example Amazon’s ‘x out of y peo-
ple found the following review helpful’. Other applications
generate the global score by combining techniques from the
text classification area and opinion/sentiment analysis, see
[2, 9] for some recent examples. However, a review that is
helpful for one user is not necessarily equally useful for an-
other user. This is e.g. reflected in Epinions’ system, where
members can evaluate the helpfulness of a review by assign-
ing a rating which ranges from ‘not helpful’ (1/5) to ‘most
helpful’ (5/5). If all the users who have read a particular
review found it very helpful, it is reasonable to assume that
a new user might appreciate it too. In such cases, a global
score reflects the general agreement very well, and new users
can immediately see that this is a review that they should
read. However, the more challenging reviews are those that
receive a variety of high and low scores, reflecting disagree-
ment about the review. We call such reviews controversial
reviews (CRs). More than in any other case, a helpfulness
prediction for a user needs to be truly personalized when
the review under consideration is controversial; i.e., when a
review has both ‘ardent supporters’ and ‘motivated adver-
saries’, with no clear majority in either group.
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This is where recommender systems (RSs) come into play.
Such systems use information about their user’s profiles and
relationships to suggest items that might be of interest to
them [1]. Recommender systems are often used to accurately
estimate the degree to which a particular user (the target
user) will like a particular item (the target item), and are
hence particularly useful for predicting the helpfulness of
CRs. For example, in Epinions, the ratings and relation-
ships of the users are used to determine which reviews are
shown to a particular user, and in what order.
Most widely used methods for making recommendations
are either content-based or collaborative filtering methods.
Content-based methods suggest items similar to the ones
that the user previously indicated a liking for. Hence, these
methods tend to have their recommendation scope limited
to the immediate neighbourhood of the users’ past purchase
history or rating record for items. RSs can be improved
significantly by (additionally) using collaborative filtering
(CF) [14], which typically works by identifying users whose
tastes are similar to those of the target user (i.e., neigh-
bours) and by computing predictions that are based on the
ratings of these neighbours. The advanced recommendation
techniques that we discuss in this paper adhere to the CF
paradigm, in the sense that a recommendation for a target
item is based on ratings by other users for that item, rather
than on an analysis of the item’s content.
Research [15] has pointed out that people tend to rely more
on recommendations from people they trust than on online
RSs which generate recommendations based on anonymous
people similar to them. This observation, combined with the
growing popularity of open social networks and the trend to
integrate e-commerce applications with RSs, has generated
a rising interest in trust-enhanced recommendation systems
(see e.g. [4, 6, 11, 13, 17]). Such systems incorporate a
trust network in which the users are connected by scores
indicating how much they trust each other, and use that
knowledge to generate recommendations: users receive rec-
ommendations for items rated highly by people in their web
of trust (WOT), or even by people who are trusted by these
WOT members (trust propagation), etc.
Apart from trust, in a large group of users, each with their
own intentions, tastes and opinions, it is only natural that
also distrust begins to emerge. For example, Epinions first
provided the possiblity to include users in a personal WOT
(based on their quality as a reviewer), and later on also intro-
duced the concept of a personal ‘block list’, which reflects the
members that are distrusted by a particular user. The infor-
mation in the WOT and block list is then used to make the
ordered list of presented reviews more personalized. From
a theoretical perspective, too, it is generally acknowledged
that distrust can play an important role [5, 17, 18], but
much ground remains to be covered in this domain.
This study provides a head-to-head comparison of the per-
formance of several trust-enhanced algorithms in terms of
their coverage and accuracy of recommendations for CRs,
i.e., reviews that typically receive a variety of conflicting
ratings. The comparison includes CF, as well as the well-
known trust-enhanced strategies proposed by Golbeck et
al. [4], Massa et al. [11], and O’Donovan et al. [13]. Further-
more, we study the effect of three new strategies to involve
distrust into the recommendation process, viz. distrust as
an indicator to reverse deviations, distrust as a filter, and
distrust as a debugger of a WOT. We conduct our experi-
ments on a large data set from Epinions; in the following
section, we analyze its controversiality level. In Sect. 3,
we discuss the rationale behind several well-known trust-
and new distrust-enhanced algorithms, while their perfor-
mance is analyzed in Sect. 4. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the potential of utilizing distrust in the RS’s process
has not been experimentally evaluated before.
2. CONTROVERSIAL REVIEWS
Epinions.com is a popular e-commerce site where users can
write reviews about products and assign a rating to them.
Guha et al. [5] compiled a data set containing 1 560 144 re-
views that received 25 170 637 ratings by 163 634 different
users. These reviews are evaluated by assigning a helpful-
ness rating which ranges from ‘not helpful’ (1/5) to ‘most
helpful’ (5/5). Most reviews receive very high scores, in fact,
76.9% of all ratings are ‘most helpful’. This means that a
simple algorithm that always predicts 5, or that uses the av-
erage score for the review as its prediction, will have a high
accuracy. However, such recommendation strategies have
difficulties coping with CRs. These reviews receive a variety
of high and low scores, reflecting disagreement about them.
A straightforward way to detect CRs in a data set is to
inspect the standard deviation of the ratings for each re-
view i (see e.g. [11, 12]). The higher the standard deviation
of the ratings for a review, the more controversial the review
is. We denote this by σ(i). A little under 10% of the reviews
have a σ of at least 0.9; there are 103 495 such reviews in
total. About 70% of all reviews have a σ that is lower than
0.5. This comes as no surprise, since the low values are due
to the abundance of 5-ratings. However, standard deviation
does not convey the full picture of controversiality, as we
argued in [16]. To get a clearer picture of the true CRs, we
introduced the following measure:
Definition 1 (Level of Disagreement). For a sys-
tem with discrete ratings on a scale from 1 to M , let ∆ ∈
{1, . . . ,M}. The ∆-level of disagreement for an item i is
defined as
(α@∆)(i) = 1− max
a∈{1,...,M−∆+1}
(∑a+∆−1
k=a fi(k)∑M
k=1 fi(k)
)
with fi(k) the number of times that review i received rating k.
This measure looks at how often adjacent scores appear
w.r.t. the total number of received ratings. The underly-
ing intuition is that different scores that are close to each
other reflect less disagreement than different scores that are
on opposite ends of the scale.
While a small σ typically entails a small level of disagree-
ment, there is considerable variation for high values of σ
(and vice versa) [16], which shows that σ and α@∆ are sig-
nificantly different measures that can be used together:
Definition 2 ((σ?, α?)-controversial). We call re-
view i (σ?, α?)-controversial iff σ(i) ≥ σ? and (α@2)(i) ≥ α?.
Applying this definition to the data set requires a parameter
selection that is adapted to its characteristics, for example
the predominance of rating value 5. We choose σ? = 0.9
and α? = 0.4, obtaining a subset of 28 710 items for which a
recommender system might experience high prediction dif-
ficulties. To ensure real controversiality, we further restrict
the set to contain only the 1416 controversial reviews that
have been rated at least 20 times, since the controversiality
of reviews with few ratings may be due to chance.
3. RECOMMENDATION STRATEGIES
RSs come in many flavours, including content-based, col-
laborative filtering and trust-based methods; the latter two
being the ones most relevant to our current efforts.
3.1 Collaborative filtering
In collaborative filtering algorithms [14], a rating of target
item i for target user a can be predicted using a combination
of the ratings of the neighbours of a (similar users) that
are already familiar with item i. The classical CF-formula
is given by (CF). The unknown rating pa,i for item i and
target user a is predicted based on the mean ra of ratings by
a for other items, as well as on the ratings ru,i by other users
u for i. The formula also takes into account the similarity
wa,u between users a and u, usually calculated as Pearson’s
Correlation Coefficient (PCC) [8]. In practice, most often
only users with a positive correlation wa,u who have rated i
are considered. We denote this set by R+.
p
(1)
a,i = ra +
∑
u∈R+ wa,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈R+ wa,u
(CF)
3.2 Trust-based methods
Trust-enhanced recommender systems often use information
coming from a trust network in which users are connected
by trust scores indicating how much they trust each other;
in general, ta,u is a number between 0 and 1 indicating to
what extent a trusts u.
Trust-based weighted mean refines the baseline strategy of
simply computing the average rating for the target item. In
particular, by including trust scores that reflect the degree
to which the raters are trusted, it allows to differentiate
between the sources; it is natural to assign more weight to
ratings of highly trusted users. The formula is given by (T1),
in which RT represents the set of users who evaluated i and
for which ta,u exceeds a given threshold value. This formula
is at the heart of Golbeck et al.’s TidalTrust [4].
p
(2)
a,i =
∑
u∈RT ta,uru,i∑
u∈RT ta,u
(T1)
Another class of trust-enhanced systems is tied more closely
to the CF algorithm. O’Donovan et al.’s trust-based filter-
ing [13] adapts (CF) by only taking into account trustworthy
neighbours, i.e., users in RT+ = RT ∩R+ instead of R+. In
other words, we only consider users who are trusted by the
target user a and have a positive correlation with a:
p
(3)
a,i = ra +
∑
u∈RT+ wa,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈RT+ wa,u
(T2)
Instead of a PCC-based computation of the weights, one
can also infer the weights through the relations of the target
user in the trust network, as in (T1). We call this alterna-
tive for CF trust-based CF ; see (T3) which adapts (T2) by
replacing the PCC weights wa,u by the trust values ta,u.
p
(4)
a,i = ra +
∑
u∈RT ta,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈RT ta,u
(T3)
This method is known as Massa et al.’s MoleTrust [10]. Note
that, because the weights are not equal to the PCC, this pro-
cedure can produce out of bounds results. When this is the
case, p
(4)
a,i is rounded to the nearest possible rating.
A very important feature of trust-enhanced RSs is their use
of trust propagation operators; mechanisms to estimate the
trust transitively by computing how much trust an agent a
has in another agent c, given the value of trust for a trusted
third party b by a, and c by b. Both TidalTrust and Mo-
leTrust invoke trust propagation to expand the set RT of
trusted users. However, the way they implement this oper-
ation differs significantly, see [3] and [10]. Although trust
propagation is not used in (T2) because the trust scores are
automatically generated [13], it is of course possible to do so;
since trust scores are not used explicitly in this formula, we
only need to specify how propagation enlarges the set RT .
It has been demonstrated that including trust in the pro-
cess significantly improves accuracy [3, 11]. On the other
hand, the coverage of (T2) and (T3) remains lower than
their classical counterpart (CF) [11]. One way of mending
this is by using trust propagation. Another way is to max-
imize the synergy between CF and its trust-based variants,
as done in the following algorithm [16]:
p
(5)
a,i = ra+ (T4)∑
u∈RT ta,u(ru,i − ru) +
∑
u∈R+\RT wa,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈RT ta,u +
∑
u∈R+\RT wa,u
The rationale behind this strategy is that we take into ac-
count all possible ways to obtain a positive weight for a user
who has rated the target item, favouring a trust relation over
a PCC-based one; in particular, if a user can be reached by a
(in)direct trust relation, we use this value instead of the PCC
to obtain the user’s weight. In this way, we retain the accu-
racy benefit by first looking at the trusted users, while on the
other hand the coverage can increase by taking into account
neighbours for which no trust information is available.
3.3 Distrust-enhanced algorithms
It is generally acknowledged that apart from trust, also dis-
trust can play an important role in trust networks, see e.g. [5,
7, 17, 18]. However, to the best of our knowledge, its poten-
tial has not been experimentally evaluated yet. This is due
to several reasons, the most important ones being that very
few data sets containing explicit distrust are available, and
that there is no general consensus about how to propagate
it and to use it for recommendation purposes.
In most current approaches, distrust information is mod-
eled by means of [0,1]-valued scores da,u that indicate to
what extent a distrusts u, and that can be issued along with
trust scores ta,u. Moreover, various propagation strategies
for (trust,distrust) couples have been presented [7, 17].
Distrust as a filter The use of distrust for RSs can be
explored in several ways. A first strategy is to use distrust
to filter out ‘unwanted’ individuals from collaborative rec-
ommendation processes. For instance, we propose
p
(6)
a,i = ra +
∑
u∈R+\RD wa,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈R+\RD wa,u
, (D2)
in which (CF) is adapted so as to exclude distrusted users as
neighbours; RD represents the set of users who have rated
the target item and that are distrusted by the target user
to some degree. This is a similar approach to (T2) which
restricts the neighbours to be trusted users.
Distrust as a debugger of a WOT In the same spirit,
various researchers have suggested that distrust be used to
debug a WOT (see e.g. [5, 18]): suppose that a trusts b
completely, b fully trusts c and a completely distrusts c,
then the latter fact invalidates the propagated trust result
(viz. a trusts c). As such, distrust-enhanced algorithms may
be useful to filter out ‘false positives’. This strategy leads to
two new formulas, (D1) and (D3), adaptations of (T1) and
(T3) in which RT is replaced by RT \RD.
p
(7)
a,i =
∑
u∈RT \RD ta,uru,i∑
u∈RT \RD ta,u
(D1)
p
(8)
a,i = ra +
∑
u∈RT \RD ta,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈RT \RD ta,u
(D3)
We can also apply the above strategy to (T4), see (D4):
we propose to use trust scores for those users which can
be reached through propagation but for which no distrust
propagation path can be found, and PCC scores for those
in R+ \RTD with RTD = RT ∪RD, i.e., the remaining ones
which have a positive correlation with a but do not belong
to RT nor RD, i.e. neither trust nor distrust information is
available about them.
p
(9)
a,i = ra+ (D4)∑
u∈RT \RD ta,u(ru,i − ru) +
∑
u∈R+\RTD wa,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈RT \RD ta,u +
∑
u∈R+\RTD wa,u
Distrust as an indicator to reverse deviations A third
distrust strategy is the direct incorporation of distrust into
the recommendation process by considering distrust scores
as negative weights. We propose formula (D5), which is an
extended version of (T3) in which distrust is regarded as an
indication for reversing the deviation ru,i − ru.
p
(10)
a,i =ra +
∑
u∈RT ta,u(ru,i − ru)∑
u∈RT ta,u
−
∑
v∈RD da,v(rv,i − rv)∑
v∈RD da,v
(D5)
If no distrusted users have rated the target item (RD = ∅),
the second fraction is omitted and (D5) collapses to (T3).
Table 1: Performance of trust-based algorithms
ALGORITHM % COV MAE RMSE
(CF) CF with positive PCC 94 0.96 1.13
(T1) Trust-based weight. mean 63 0.86 1.20
(T2) Trust-based filtering 60 0.86 1.16
(T3) Trust-based CF 63 0.87 1.16
(T4) EnsembleTrustCF 94 0.94 1.11
(PT1) Propagated Trust-based weighted mean 88 0.91 1.22
(PT2) Propagated Trust-based filtering 84 0.94 1.13
(PT3) Propagated Trust-based CF 88 0.99 1.16
(PT4) Propagated EnsembleTrustCF 94 0.96 1.12
4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Epinions allows users to evaluate other users based on the
quality of their reviews, and to provide trust and distrust
evaluations in addition to ratings. Users can evaluate other
users by including them in their WOT (a list of review-
ers whose reviews and ratings were consistently found to be
valuable1), or by putting them in their block list (a list of au-
thors whose reviews were consistently found to be offensive,
inaccurate or low quality1, thus indicating distrust). In our
data set, these evaluations make up a WOT graph consisting
of 131 829 users and 840 799 non self-referring (dis)trust rela-
tions. Note that the data set only contains binary (dis)trust
values, hence in our experiments ta,u and da,u in (T1)–(D5)
can take on the values 0 (absence) and 1 (full presence) only.
To measure the performance of RSs, we work with the
leave one out method. In particular, we use two well-known
accuracy measures, viz. mean absolute error (MAE) and
root mean squared error (RMSE) [8]. Since reviews are rated
on a scale from 1 to 5, the extreme values that MAE/RMSE
can reach are 0 and 4. Besides accuracy, we also consider
coverage: during the leave one out we count how many pre-
dictions can be generated for the hidden scores. We com-
puted the coverage and accuracy of the algorithms discussed
in Sect. 3, for the 1416 CRs described in Sect. 2.
4.1 Performance of trust-based approaches
Table 1 shows the relative coverage and accuracy for CRs in
the data set. For simplicity, we only consider one-step prop-
agation. For (PT1) and (PT3), we maintained the propaga-
tion strategy used in TidalTrust and MoleTrust respectively,
while for (PT2) we added a user to RT if he belongs to the
WOT of the target user a, or is directly trusted by a WOT
member of a. For (PT4), we assign gradual propagated trust
weights ta,u = (PCC+1)/2. In this way, users u who cannot
be reached through a direct trust relation are still rewarded
for their presence in a’s propagated WOT.
Without propagation, it is clear that the coverage of (CF)
and (T4) is superior to that of the other strategies, and ap-
proaches the maximal value. This is due to the fact that
PCC information is, in general, more readily available than
direct trust information (there are normally more users for
which a positive correlation with the target user a can be
computed than users in a’s WOT). Our new algorithm (T4)
is most flexible, since having either some trust or a posi-
tive correlation is sufficient to make a prediction. On the
other hand, (T2) which also uses PCC weights, is the most
demanding strategy because it requires users in a’s WOT
who have already rated two other items in common with
a. In between these extremes, the coverage for (T1) and
1See www.epinions.com/help/faq/
(T3) is the same. This ranking of approaches in terms of
coverage still applies when propagated trust information is
taken into account, but note that the difference with CF has
shrunk considerably. In particular, thanks to trust propa-
gation, coverage increases with about 25%; except for (T4),
for which the unpropagated version continues to score bet-
ter than the propagated versions of (T1)–(T3).
Clearly, generating good predictions for CRs is hard. When
focusing on the MAE, we notice that, without propagation,
the trust-enhanced approaches all yield significantly better
results than CF, which is in accordance with the observa-
tions made in [3, 12]. This can be attributed to the accu-
racy/coverage trade-off: a coverage increase is usually at the
expense of accuracy, and vice versa. It also becomes clear
when taking into account trust propagation: as the cover-
age of (PT1)–(PT3) nears that of (CF) and (T4), so do the
MAEs. However, the RMSEs give us a different picture:
those of the trust-enhanced methods are generally higher
than that of CF; recall that a higher RMSE means that
more large prediction errors occur. One possible explana-
tion is the fact that the set RT of trusted acquaintances
that have rated the target item is too small, and in par-
ticular smaller than R+. This hypothesis is also supported
by the fact that with trust propagation (which enlarges RT )
RMSEs rise at a slower rate than the corresponding MAEs.
We can also observe that our new algorithm is a valu-
able asset in the trust-enhanced domain: it achieves the
best scores for CRs in terms of RMSE. The MAE for the
unpropagated version of (T4) is higher than those of (T1)–
(T3), but this is amply compensated by the much higher
coverage. The coverage gap diminishes when taking into
account propagation, but so does the difference in MAEs.
4.2 Utility of distrust
The results of our experiments can be found in Table 2. Let
us first concentrate on the first line in which we evaluated
the use of direct incorporation of distrust, see (D5). The
high increase in accuracy (MAE as well as RMSE) com-
pared to its trust-only counterpart (T3) is not compensated
by a similar increase in coverage. This demonstrates that
distrust should not be used as a way to reverse deviations.
The middle part of Table 2 focuses on the use of distrust to
filter out ‘unwanted’ individuals without propagation. The
results for (D2) and (D4) show that this kind of distrust fil-
ter has little or no effect on the results of (CF) and (T4): an
item that is only rated by distrusted users is very uncommon
because of the trust/distrust ratio in the data set (only 15%
of all relations are distrust-based) and the fact that we are
dealing with popular items. Hence, the unchanged relative
coverage comes as no surprise. Also note that the accuracy
slightly increases when filtering out distrusted users. Re-
mark that we cannot use this kind of filter for (D1) and (D3)
if no trust propagation is involved, since a user cannot put
another user in his WOT and in his block list simultaneously.
In the lower part of Table 2 we further investigate the poten-
tial of filters; we focus on the utility of distrust as a debugger
for a target user’s web of trust. This results in extended ver-
sions of the strategies in the lower part of Table 1. When
considering trust propagation and distrust filtering, we need
a definition of distrust propagation. We adopt a binary ap-
Table 2: Performance of distrust-based algorithms
ALGORITHM % COV MAE RMSE
(D5) Trust+distrust based CF 67 0.97 1.31
(D2) Trust+distrust-based filtering 94 0.95 1.12
(D4) EnsembleTrust+Distrust CF 94 0.93 1.10
(PD1) Prop. trust+distrust-based weighted mean 86 0.91 1.23
(PD2) Prop. trust+distrust-based filtering 91 0.96 1.18
(PD3) Prop. trust+distrust-based CF 86 0.93 1.14
(PD4) Prop. EnsembleTrustCF 92 0.95 1.17
proach in which the set of distrusted users of target user
a contains all users who are directly distrusted by a, who
are distrusted by the members of a’s WOT, and users in
the WOT of users who are distrusted by a. In other words,
‘distrust your enemies’ friends, as well as your friends’ en-
emies’. This approach will probably unjustly exclude some
users, but we consider it more important that it allows to
filter out the greater part of the ‘false positives’ in the (prop-
agated) WOT of the target user.
This strategy leads to a coverage decrease of about 2%-
3% for (PD1), (PD3), and (PD4), compared to the original
propagated (PT1), (PT3) and (PT4). In other words, using
trust propagation (to reach more users) and distrust propa-
gation (to filter out false positives) only has a marginal effect
on the coverage. Debugging improves the performance of
trust-based CF in terms of accuracy, but for the other two
algorithms no clear conclusion can be drawn: the MAEs
are never worse than their trust-only counterparts, but the
RMSE results show discrepant values.
Remark that formula (PD2) differs from (PD1), (PD3)
and (PD4) because it does not use trust propagation to en-
large the set of neighbours, but only distrust propagation to
restrict the set. In this case, users that are directly or indi-
rectly distrusted by the target user are filtered out. Hence
the decrease in coverage compared to (CF), whereas for (D2)
and (CF) the relative coverage remained unchanged. This
strategy yields equal MAE’s but increasing RMSEs.
Although the results presented in this section are still pre-
liminary, they already indicate that regarding distrust as an
indication to reverse deviations is not the line to take. Dis-
trust as a filter and/or debugger looks more promising, but
more experiments, on other data sets with different char-
acteristics (for example with a higher distrust ratio), are
needed to come to a more precise conclusion.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have provided a comparative analysis of the performance
of collaborative filtering and trust-enhanced recommenda-
tion algorithms for controversial reviews (CRs). We have
evaluated several well-known and new recommender tech-
niques on a data set from Epinions which contains rating
information, trust and distrust information. However, the
data set has one shortcoming: the (dis)trust values are bi-
nary, making it impossible to investigate all aspects of the
algorithms, since a lot of the existing trust-based approaches
are based on the assumption that trust is a gradual concept.
Unfortunately, no such data sets are publically available.
Trust-enhanced recommender systems experience difficul-
ties when predicting ratings for CRs. A coverage and ac-
curacy based comparison shows no clear winner among the
three state-of-art trust-enhanced strategies proposed in [3,
10, 13]. We also provided the first experimental evalua-
tion of the potential of distrust in RSs. To our knowledge,
the data set we use is the only one that contains explic-
itly issued distrust statements. Only 15% of all relations
are distrust-based; consequently, experiments on future data
sets with different characteristics may yield clearer answers
to the question whether distrust can be used as a debugger
and/or filter. The same remark also applies to other results
in this paper. E.g., in data sets containing users with a more
varying rating behaviour, more true CRs can be detected. It
remains an open question whether distrust can play a bene-
ficial role in recommender systems, but we believe that the
reported observations and the questions raised along with
them can help researchers to further examine its possibilities.
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